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Abstract
This paper provides an empirical investigation of the wage, price and
unemployment dynamics that have taken place in Spain during the last
two decades. The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the impact
of the European economic integration process on Spanish labour market
and the convergence to a European level of prosperity. We ﬁnd some
important lessons to be learnt from the Spanish experience that should
be relevant for the new member states. First, high competitiveness in the
tradable sector seems crucial for the real and nominal convergence to be
successful, implying that the increase of wages in the tradable sector, and
subsequently in the nontradable sector, should not be allowed to exceed
the growth in productivity. Second, before ﬁxing the real exchange rate
it seems crucial that it is on its sustainable (competitive) purchasing
power parity level. A real appreciation, as a result of high growth rates
during the catching-up period, is likely to be harmful for real growth
and employment.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we try to shed some light on the eﬀect of the European inte-
gration on price, wage, and unemployment dynamics in Spain. Spain is the
largest of the four “peripheral” countries that joined the European Union and
her experience has been successful in curbing inﬂation and promoting eco-
nomic growth and employment. By understanding the historical changes in
the macroeconomic mechanisms in Spain during the convergence period, we
might be able to better foresee (and hopefully avoid) future problems for the
new member states. For this purpose, we will analyse a dynamic interdepen-
dent system consisting of consumer and producer prices, wages, productivity,
interest rates and exchange rates. In particular we will try to address the
following questions:
1. Why were the Spanish unemployment rates so persistently high until the
mid-nineties and why did they decrease so remarkably from the mid-
nineties onwards?
2. Which were the mechanisms behind the steady decline of the Spanish
inﬂation rate until its ﬁnal convergence to a sustainable European level?
3. Which were the mechanisms behind the improvement in labour produc-
tivity over this period?
Our sample begins in 1983:1, a few years after the EMS regime became
eﬀective with 11 member states adopting the ERM exchange rate arrangement.
Spain did not become a member in the ﬁrst round: the Spanish inﬂation was
too high and the economy suﬀered from various structural imbalances. When
our sample starts, the Spanish purchasing power parity (hereafter PPP) was
at a much lower level than most of the more prosperous EEC member states.
When our sample ends in 2003:3, Spain has achieved a PPP level similar to the
other European member states. In this sense the Spanish experience is a clear
success story. The question is whether there are useful lessons to be learnt by
a historical analysis of the nominal and real convergence that obviously took
place over this period. The purpose of this paper is to empirically identify
successes and failures and how these inﬂuenced the path towards a common
European purchasing parity level.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss
the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect for the convergence of prices and productivity in
Spain. Section 3 provides a graphical analysis of the major key variables and
discusses their co-movements. Section 4 discusses a theoretical background
for the relations to be tested. Section 5 contains the empirical analysis of
the wage, price and unemployment dynamics including an identiﬁed long-run
cointegration structure and the corresponding adjustment dynamics. Section
6 concludes.
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2 The Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect and the nominal
and real convergence towards the EU
The fact that real exchange rates of less wealthy economies generally deviate
substantially from the ones of the more wealthy economies is often referred to
as the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect (Balassa, 1964, Samuelson, 1964). In short it
says that a country’s general price level is positively related to the level of per
capita income. The rational for this is that productivity in the tradeable sector
tends to be higher in richer than in poorer countries, whereas productivity in
the nontradable sector is more similar. Wage levels in the tradable sector
inﬂuence wages in the nontradable sector, so nontradables tend to be more
expensive in rich countries. For example, one Dmk converted to pesetas in the
eighties bought a lot more in Spain than one Dmk in Germany, reﬂecting the
large wage diﬀerences between the two countries.
As discussed by Boeri, et. al. (2001), movements in internal price wedge
(the diﬀerence between the consumer and the producer price index) is likely to
reﬂect the extent of product market competition. When domestic wages are
raising as a result of productivity growth, a high degree of foreign competition
is likely to prevent price increases in the tradable sector, whereas not in the
nontradable sector. This will generally lead to consumer prices increasing
more than producer prices. Therefore, a positive co-movement between labor
productivity and the price wedge can be taken as evidence of the Balassa-
Samuelson eﬀect.
At the initial state of the European economic integration, intra-European
trade was enhanced by the removal of the remaining trade barriers, by ﬁnancial
deregulation and by gradually ﬁxing the exchange rates. Thus, Spain’s com-
mitment to move towards the European monetary union in 1986 had clearly a
positive impact on its real GDP growth. In particular, the increase of export
demand for agricultural products was important in this context. The increased
prosperity initiated an adjustment process towards the European productivity
level and, gradually, towards a European purchasing power parity level. Im-
provement in productivity can be seen partly as an improvement of technology,
partly as an increase in labour intensity as well as a combination of the two.
The eﬀect on employment is, however, likely to be very diﬀerent in the two
cases. On one hand, improved technology will generally lead to increasing de-
mand for labor and thus, to higher real wages and employment. On the other
hand, improved labor productivity and higher real wages are likely to increase
unemployment (at least temporarily) because of a labour reallocation towards
more productive sectors (Caselli and Tenreyro, 2005). Both of these eﬀects
can be seen in the data.
Below we will attempt to make the mechanisms behind the successful tran-
sition from an outsider to a fully integrated European member state more
transparent. This will be based on a careful econometric analysis of the com-
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plicated interactions between productivity improvements, real wage growth,
inﬂation and unemployment in the transition period. The subsequent results
will demonstrate that one can broadly identify four diﬀerent regimes describ-
ing various aspects of the convergence towards the European level. Some of
these were very successful in terms of growth and prosperity, others less so.
First, we will brieﬂy discuss the basic characteristics of the four regimes.
The ﬁrst sub-period, 1983 - 1986, describes the last few years of a long
period of serious structural imbalances, characterized by slowdown in pro-
ductivity growth, high unemployment rates, real wage growth in excess of
productivity growth, and high inﬂation rates. The roots of these problems
can be traced back to the oil crisis in the seventies which hit the Spanish
economy very severely1. This shock increased product prices and decreased
labour demand. Downward wage rigidities prevented the necessary real wage
adjustment that could have restored the demand for labor. Strong bargaining
power by labor unions resulted in wage claims which substantially exceeded
productivity growth. The result was stagﬂation: inﬂation as well as unem-
ployment increased in this period.2 Thus, real GDP growth was still modest
and unemployment rate was high up to the decision in 1986 to join the EMS.
The second sub-period, 1987 - 1993, describes the early EMS period ending
with the crisis in 1992. In most of this period Spain experienced high growth,
declining unemployment rates, together with raising real wages and consumer
prices, very much in accordance with the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect. In the
ﬁrst years Spain adopted the broad bands of the Exchange Rate Mechanism
(±6%) and from 1989 the narrow bands (±2.25%). Even though productivity
continued to increase, there was a sign of a slowdown at the end of the period,
possibly indicating that productivity had begun to catch up with the EU level.
With high real interest rates, Spain experienced large inﬂows of foreign capital,
and the consequent appreciation of the Spanish peseta eroded competitiveness
in the export sector. At the same time, a steady increase of real wages in
excess of productivity resulted in a serious loss of competitiveness. Because the
membership in the ERM prevented competitive devaluations, the economy got
stuck in external and internal imbalances that gradually became unsustainable.
This was spotted by the ﬁnancial market which launched a speculative attack
on the Spanish peseta in September 1992 forcing Spain to leave the narrow
bands of the ERM and to devalue the peseta.3
The third sub-period, 1993-1998, describes the restructuring and consol-
idation regime starting from the speculative attack in September 1992 and
1In 1977 approximately 66% of the consumed energy was imported.
2From 1977 to 1985 Spain experienced a huge employment reduction (about two million
jobs) which raised the unemployment rate to 21% of the labour force.
3The Spanish currency was first devaluated by 5% in September 1992 and further 6%
and 8% in November 1992 and May 1993 respectively. The last devaluation took place in
March 1995 by a 7%.
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ending with the launch of the Euro in 1999. During the ﬁrst years, the ﬂoat-
ing peseta brought the real exchange rate back to its pre-1987 level. The
market labour reforms of 1994 and 1997 contributed to reduce labor union´s
bargaining power. Excessive wage claims were avoided and competitiveness
was restored. From 1996 onwards, almost ten years after the membership in
the EU, unemployment rates started to decline more permanently. In 1999,
Spain was ﬁnally joining EMU as a full member.
The fourth sub-period, 1999-2003, describes the more recent period of full
EMU membership during which the Spanish economy seems to have done very
well: productivity increased, inﬂation remained at the EU level, real interest
rates came down and economic activity improved.
3 A graphical analysis
To illustrate why we found it useful to divide the full sample period into the
four sub-periods, we will present a graphical analysis of the development of
wages, prices, productivity and unemployment rate and how they are related
to the ﬂuctuations in the real exchange rates and in the long-term interest
rate. To better see the co-movements between the variables, we have generally
adjusted the graphs to have the same mean and range.
Figure 1(a) illustrates the strong co-movement between productivity (log
output divided by log employment) and the internal price wedge (log consumer
prices minus log producer prices) consistent with the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect.
This co-movement is particularly dominant in the ERM period 1987-1992. As
discussed above shocks to the price wedge are likely to reﬂect competitiveness
in the tradable sector as well as the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect. The latter is
likely to generate a systematic trend in the price wedge, whereas the former
is not. In Figure 1(a) we note that the price wedge has grown almost lin-
early until 1994-95, after which the growth is tapering oﬀ. This is taken as
an indication that the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect was very signiﬁcant until the
beginning of third subperiod, but less so after 1995.
Figure 1(b) shows strong counter-cyclical movements between unemploy-
ment and trend-adjusted productivity over the whole period. The increase
in unemployment in the ﬁrst pre-ERM regime seems to coincide with a slow-
down in productivity growth, whereas the strong growth cycle in the second
regime signiﬁcantly improved employment. The strong recession in the third
regime which coincided with the speculative attack on the peseta dramatically
increased unemployment. The subsequent recovery implied a steady improve-
ment of employment, with unemployment rates falling to previously record low
levels.
Figure 2(a) illustrates the co-movements between real product wages cor-
rected for productivity (the negative of the proﬁt share) and real exchange
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rates: In the ﬁrst period, real exchange rates were essentially ﬂuctuating
around a constant level as was proﬁt shares, whereas the second period ex-
hibited a steady appreciation of the peseta mostly due to the strong produc-
tivity growth in this period but also to the high levels of the Spanish interest
rate. Because real producer wages increased at the same time as the peseta
appreciated, proﬁt shares and competitiveness declined. In September 1992
the speculative attack forced the peseta to ﬂoat and in the next two years it
lost roughly 26% of its value.
Figure 2(b) illustrates the development of productivity (corrected for sea-
sonal means) and real producer wages (corrected for seasonal means). The
strong growth in real product wages in excess of the growth in productivity is
notable in the third regime. As evidenced by Figure 2(a) this coincided with a
decline in proﬁt shares. The unsustainable growth in real wages resulted in a
strong recession in 1992-1993, followed by a decline in real producer wages in
1994. From 1995 onwards, real product wages and productivity have developed
more or less in parallel.
Figure 3(a) illustrates the strong co-movements between real consumption
wages and unemployment rate in all four regimes signifying the strong un-
employment eﬀects on real consumption wages. Figure 3(b) illustrates the
development of unemployment rate compared to the CPI inﬂation showing
that the inﬂation rate has been steadily declining independent of whether un-
employment has been increasing or decreasing. Thus, there does not seem to
be a strong Phillips curve eﬀect in this period.
Figure 4(a) shows that unemployment and the long-term bond rate have
to some extent been co-moving, but that the relationship is not very clear-cut.
Unless we account for the eﬀect of other variables, it will be diﬃcult to show
a positive relationship between the two. Figure 4(b) demonstrates that CPI
inﬂation has generally been higher than PPI inﬂation, with the exception of
the ﬁrst year of the EMU and in the few years after the devaluation of the
peseta in 1993, when the rise in import prices seemed to have increased PPI
inﬂation.
Figure 5 presents a scatter graph of productivity against employment. As
can be seen the two clear periods of employment reduction (1980 to 1985 and
1990 to 1995) coincided with an important increase in labour productivity.
4 Theoretical background
In what follows we present some broadly deﬁned loglinear economic relations to
be subsequently tested. Some of these represent reduced form relations consis-
tent with several theoretical models.4 Following Layard, Nickell and Jackman
4The discussion in this section is strongly influenced by Chapter 19 in Juselius (2005).
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(1991), we consider an open-economy model with price-setting ﬁrms and non-
competitive wage determination. This framework seems appropriate for the
Spanish labor market, where wages to a large extent have been set by collec-
tive wage bargaining. A proposed pay rise by the labor union reﬂects generally
a trade-oﬀ between a higher consumption wage against a lower employment
as a result of an increase in the real product wage (Flanagan et. al., 1993).
Whether the pay rise is accepted or not by the employers’ organizations is
likely to depend on a trade-oﬀ between future proﬁts and ﬁrm competitiveness
against the increased risk of a union strike.
The centralized part of the wage formation is assumed to be a struggle
over the mark-ups, where expectations of future outcomes of key variables
may play a signiﬁcant role. We assume that labor unions strive to maximize
their share of the productivity increase where productivity is deﬁned as output
per employed, qt = yt − lt. The employers’ unions attempt to maximize the
mark-up on unit costs, deﬁned here as the negative of (wt − py,t − qt), at
the same time accounting for the anticipated eﬀect of an increase of the real
product price on its competitiveness. The mark-up is assumed to be a function
of expected inﬂation, ∆pet , expected nominal interests, Ret , and the expected
real exchange rate, reret = (s+ pf − pd)et , where s is nominal exchange rate, pf
is the foreign price level, pd is the domestic price level, i.e.:
(wt − py,t − qt) = f(reret , Ret ,∆pet ) + v1,t (1)
where freret > 0 implies a lower mark-up as a result of a real appreciation (see
Phelps, 1994), fRet > 0 implies a lower mark-up as a result of a rise in the
interest rate, and f∆pe > 0 indicates a negative eﬀect on the markup from
inﬂation (see Banerjee and Russell, 2005).
The labor unions attempt to maximize the purchasing power for their mem-
bers by increasing the real consumer wage, (wt−pc,t) conditional on the level of
productivity, qt, and accounting for the expected eﬀect on the unemployment
rate, U et , real exchange rate and inﬂation rate, i.e.:
(wt − pc,t − qt) = g(U et ,∆pet , reret ) + v2,t (2)
where gUe < 0, g∆pe > 0 and greret > 0. Expected values, X
e
t , are not assumed
to deviate from the actual values Xt with more than a stationary error.
The bargaining power of the labor unions is assumed to be approximated
by a fraction ω, where 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1, so that the outcome of the negotiations can
be formulated as a weighted average of the real consumer wage and the real
product wage.
An aggregate wage relation for the real product wage can now be formulated
as:
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wt − py,t = (1− ω)(pc,t − py,t) + qt + h(U et ,∆pet , reret , Ret ) + v3,t (3)
or, equivalently, for the real consumption wage:
wt − pc,t = −ω(pc,t − py,t) + qt + h(U et ,∆pet , reret , Ret ) + v3,t (4)
Assuming log linearity and focussing on (4), the hypothetical long-run con-
sumer wage relation becomes:
wt − pc,t = a1(pc,t − py,t) + qt + a2Ut + a3∆pt + a4rert + a5Rt + a0 + v3,t (5)
where expected values have been replaced with actual observations, a1 is an
estimate of (1− ω), a2 ≤ 0, a3 ≥ 0, a4 ≥ 0, a5 ≥ 0, and a0 is an intercept.
Provided that v3,t is stationary, and that the individual variables are non-
stationary, there exists several possible cointegration speciﬁcations which can
reproduce (5). Because both the wage share of output prices and of consumer
prices exhibit typical nonstationary behavior as demonstrated by Figure 6,
cointegration analysis can be used to test the hypothetical determinants in (1)
and (2). However, the result that proﬁt shares are cointegrated with real ex-
change rates, say, does not exclude the possibility that the former are aﬀected
by the other determinants. This is because some of the relevant determinants
can be cointegrated between themselves and, thus, inﬂuence real wages through
their own regression coeﬃcient. For example, if the seven variables in (5) share
two common stochastic trends (as we ﬁnd), then there would be ﬁve irreducible
cointegration relations between the variables. With more common stochastic
trends there would be correspondingly less cointegration. This implies that
we can use cointegration techniques to ﬁnd out which of the determinants in
(1) and (2) are most strongly cointegrated with real product and consumption
wages corrected for productivity as well as other relevant relationships in the
data as exempliﬁed below.
For example, if Ut and ∆pc,t share one common stochastic trend then they
would be cointegrated :
∆pct = a6 + a7Ut + v4,t (6)
where a7 ≤ 0 would imply a Phillips curve relation with a constant natural
rate5. Another possibility is a "demand-for-labor" relation describing unem-
5Note that the Phillips curve is defined here to be a relation between nonstationary
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ployment rate as a function of the basic determinants of the demand for labor:
Ut = a8(wt − pc,t) + a9Rt + a10rert + a11 + v5,t (7)
where a8 ≥ 0, a9 ≥ 0, and a10 ≥ 0 would be consistent with a demand for labor
interpretation.
Among the variables in (5) we would also expect to ﬁnd a medium-run
relation describing the dynamic adjustment of inﬂation rate to the level of
relative prices. For example, the hypothesis that inﬂation rate is dynamically
adjusting to the domestic and the foreign price wedge and to real wages can
be speciﬁed as:
∆pc,t = a12 + a13(pc − py)t−1 + a14rert−1 + a15(w − pc)t−1 + v6,t (8)
where a13 ≤ 0, a14 ≥ 0, and a15 ≥ 0 implies equilibrium correction given that
v7,t ∼ I(0).
Diﬀerent bargaining structures imply diﬀerent terms of trade between a
rise in the real consumption wage and the real product wage (Flanagan et. al.,
1993). For example under mark-up pricing, if wages increase in one sector, but
not in others, then output price will increase but the impact on the consumer
price will be small. Thus, the increase in real consumption wage will be higher
than the increase in real product wage.
However, the extent of product market competition is even more important
for the price wedge. If an industry is exposed to a high degree of foreign com-
petition, product prices cannot be raised by much even though the domestic
wages rise. Assume that a nationwide wage rise hits a highly exposed industry,
the output prices of which are already on (or above) the competitive foreign
trade level. In this case the industry has the possibility to (1) reduce employ-
ment until the marginal cost equals the competitive price, (2) increase labor
intensity, or (3) close down the industry. This scenario seems to be very rele-
vant in the investigated sample period, where increased European integration
and ﬁnancial deregulation put a strong pressure on the Spanish competitive-
ness. Output prices in this period did not fully reﬂect the increase in wages
and competitiveness was achieved by improvement in labor productivity. As
Figure 4 illustrates, productivity, rather than the real product wage, seems to
have adjusted as a result of a wage increase.
This means that we expect to ﬁnd a relationship between the internal
price wedge and productivity corrected for a trend. However, in a period
where the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect is likely to be dominant, we would expect
variables. However, given the graphs in Figure 3, it does not seem very likely that the
Phillips curve was empirically important in the present period.
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the price wedge as well as productivity to be trending upwards. Thus, the
positive relationship between productivity and the price wedge is likely to
be particularly strong in this case. As demonstrated in Section 3, Figure 1,
the time trend in the price wedge is tapering oﬀ at around 1995 when the
catching-up of productivity is approaching the European level. To account for
the "other-than-Balassa-Samuelson" productivity growth we need to allow for
a trend in the price wedge-productivity relation:
(pc,t − py,t) = a17qt + a18 + a19t + v7,t, (9)
where a17 ≥ 0, a19 ≥ 0.
5 Wage, price and unemployment dynamics in
Spain
The purpose of the empirical analysis is to extract as much information from
the data as possible at the background of the broadly deﬁned theoretical rela-
tions discussed in the previous section. When testing these relations we con-
sider an empirical rejection equally relevant as an empirical acceptance. Failure
to ﬁnd a relationship in the data is considered an important signal that a previ-
ously relevant mechanism might have become less important in the transition
period. As the economic forces activated by deregulation, abolishment of trade
barriers, increased political discipline, are likely to be substantial, we expect
the economic mechanisms to be diﬀerent in the present period as compared
to for example the period preceding the EMS. Because of lack of data for the
seventies only the EU convergence period is investigated here.
5.1 Defining the empirical model
The quarterly data used in this analysis are deﬁned by:
x′t = [rωt, qt, ut,∆pt, ppt, rert, lrt] t=1983:3 to 2003:3
where rωt is the log of real wage which corresponds to the salary per hour in
the manufactured sector deﬂated by the consumer price index; qt is the log of
labour productivity, calculated as real GDP per total employment; ut is the
unemployment rate; ∆pt is the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the log of the consumer price
index and measures inﬂation; ppt is the price wedge and corresponds to the
diﬀerence between consumer price index and producer price index, both ex-
pressed in logs; rert stands for the log of the real exchange rate of the Spanish
10
peseta relative to the German mark and is expressed in units of national cur-
rency per foreign currency; ﬁnally, lrt is the ten years government bond yield.
The long-run interest rate is divided by 400 to make the estimated coeﬃcients
comparable with logarithmic quarterly changes.
The empirical analysis is based on the VAR(2) model with a linear trend
restricted to the cointegration space:
∆xt = Γ∆xt−1 + αβ′xt−1 + αβ1t + αδ0Dst + Φ1Dpt + Φ2Dqt + µ0 + εt (10)
where µ0 = αβ0 + α⊥γ0 is unrestricted, β0 is an intercept in the cointegration
relations and γ0 measures the slope of linear trends in the data. The coeﬃ-
cient β1 is the slope of a linear time trend restricted to be in the cointegration
space, and δ0 stands for a mean shift in β′xt as a result of mean shifts in the
variables that do not cancel in the cointegrated relations6. These shifts are
captured by the three dummy variables in Dst = [DS861t, DS923t, DS991t],
where DSxxyt = 1 for t ≥ 19xx:y, otherwise 0. In addition, there are ﬁve per-
manent impulse dummies, Dpt = [Dp861t, Dp923t, Dp991t, Dp951t, Dp011t]
where DPxxy is 1 in 199xx:y, 0 otherwise.
The shift dummy DS861 accounts for the Spanish entry in the EU, DS923
describes the impact of the EMS crisis in September 1992, and DS991 accounts
for the beginning of the common monetary policy. The ﬁrst three impulse dum-
mies account for the large shock at the beginning of the three regimes in 1986:1,
1992:3 and 1999:1. The last two account for a change from monetary aggre-
gate targeting to inﬂation targeting in 1995:1 and a change in the employment
survey in 2001:1 which implied a reduction of the oﬃcial unemployment by
around 2.5%.
The baseline model has been carefully checked for signs of misspeciﬁca-
tion using a variety of diagnostic tests. According to these, the model seem
to describe the data reasonably well. No serious deviations from the basic
assumptions of residual independence, heteroscedasticity, and normality were
detected. But, of course, complete parameter constancy is hard to guarantee
in a period of such signiﬁcant changes in the macroeconomy. In this sense,
some of the estimates should be considered average eﬀects over the period in
question.
5.2 An identified structure of long-run relations
Following Juselius (2003), we expect at the outset at least two common trends
describing permanent shocks to prices and productivity and, therefore, a max-
imum number of ﬁve cointegration relationships. Table 1 reports the Bartlett
6See Juselius (2005) for a discussion of deterministic components in the cointegrated VAR
model.
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corrected trace test, the roots of the characteristic polynomial and the t-
statistic of the adjustment coeﬃcients. All this information seems to be con-
sistent with a rank of ﬁve and we continue with this choice.
Table 2 presents the identiﬁed structure of cointegration relations. The 10
overidentifying restrictions are accepted with a p-value of 0.77 based on the test
statistic χ2(10) = 6.48. Parameter constancy is checked using the recursive
test procedures in Hansen and Johansen (1999). Figure 7 shows the test of
constancy of β under forward (panel a) and backward (panel b) recursion and
ﬁgures 8 to 10 present the constancy tests for the loadings α. According to
these tests the cointegration space seems reasonably stable.
The ﬁrst relation corresponding to (1) describes that real product wages,
corrected for productivity, are cointegrated with real exchange rates with a
coeﬃcient which is consistent with the Phelps hypothesis discussed in Section
4:
rwt − qt + ppt = 0.75
[6.13]
rert + 0.14
[6.79]
Ds861 −0.37
[−10.75]
Ds923 −0.26
[−10.99]
Ds991 + 0.012
[17.69]
t.
(11)
The three shifts in the equilibrium mean suggest that the level of real wages,
corrected for productivity and real exchange rates, increased by 0.15 in the
second regime when Spain entered the EU, fell by 0.23 = 0.37 − 0.14 in the
ERM crisis regime and fell additionally by 0.26 in the EMU period.
The second relation corresponding to (2) describes that real consumption
wages, corrected for productivity, are cointegrated with unemployment rate as
well as with real exchange rates:
rwt − qt = −1.24
[−13.59]
ut + 0.47
[7.01]
rert + 0.04
[4.60]
Ds861 −0.06
[−4.70]
Ds923 −0.16
[−11.22]
Ds991
(12)
The negative and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient to unemployment rate indi-
cates that it was the high levels of unemployment rates until 1995 that ﬁnally
stopped nominal wage claims in excess of productivity growth. The positive
coeﬃcient to real exchange rates shows that real consumption wages were
compensated to some extent for the loss/increase in purchasing power parity
as a result of a devaluation/depreciation of the peseta. Similar to the ﬁrst
cointegration relation, real consumption wages, corrected for productivity, un-
employment, and real exchange rate, seemed to increase in the second regime
by 0.04, decreased in the next regime by 0.02, and decrease additionally by
0.16 in the EMU regime.
The third relation, corresponding to (9), shows that productivity and the
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price wedge corrected for a trend have been cointegrated, signifying the strong
Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect in this period:
qt = 0.31
[7.60]
ppt −0.08
[−9.03]
Ds923 + 0.004
[17.46]
t (13)
The negative coeﬃcient to the shift dummy measures the average drop in
the level of real GDP at 1992:3 as a result of the loss of competitiveness that
triggered oﬀ the ERM crisis. The trend coeﬃcient shows that productivity
grew with 1.6% per year in addition to the Balassa-Samuelson catching-up
growth.
The forth relation corresponding to (8), shows that inﬂation rate has dy-
namically adjusted to the internal and external price wedge:
∆pt = −0.04
[−9.18]
ppt −0.02
[−3.91]
rert (14)
Thus, the development in external and internal competitiveness seems to
explain the decline in inﬂation rate over this period. The absence of a real wage
eﬀect in (14) suggests that wage pressure (cost-push) has not been important
for inﬂation in this period. This again suggest pricing-to-market, rather than
mark-up-pricing, as the dominant price-setting mechanism. Given a very com-
petitive product market, excessive wage claims are likely to lead to adjustment
in labor productivity (and labor lay-oﬀs) rather than adjustment in prices.
This is likely to explain why inﬂation rate has been steadily decreasing, even
though real wages have increased more than productivity in this period. This
interpretation is strongly supported by the last relation which corresponds to
the demand for labor relation in (7):
ut = 0.75
[10.67]
rwt + 0.42
[10.38]
rert + 4.0
[12.16]
lrtt −0.08
[−7.19]
Ds923 −0.08
[−10.84]
Ds991 (15)
It shows that unemployment rate has increased with real consumption
wages, has increased when the exchange rate has depreciated, and has increased
with the long-term interest rate. The shift dummies shows that unemployment
came down signiﬁcantly as a result of the restoration of competitiveness after
September 1992, and after joining the EMU in 1999. Thus, the results suggest
a strong trade-oﬀ between unemployment and real wage increases in excess of
productivity growth.
Finally, the empirical testing did not support a Phillips-curve relationship
between inﬂation rate and unemployment rate. This is further evidence of the
decreasing importance of cost-push pressure of wage inﬂation on price inﬂation
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and the increasing importance of the real wage - unemployment trade-oﬀ.
5.3 The dynamics of the short-run adjustment behavior
Table 3 presents a parsimonious representation of the short-run dynamic ad-
justment structure in which insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients have been set to zero.
The test of the 67 overidentifying zero restrictions was accepted based on
χ2(67) = 78.72 and a p-value of 0.15. Since the dynamic adjustments to the
long-run relations is particularly interesting, we will focus on this aspect when
commenting on the estimated results.
The real consumption wages are signiﬁcantly overshooting in terms of the
real producer mark-up relation (ecm1), whereas they are strongly equilibrium
correcting to the real consumer wage relation (ecm2). These are interesting
results suggesting that labor unions have been able to achieve excessive real
wage increases, but at the price of a subsequent increase in unemployment rate
that brought the level of real consumption wages back to steady-state. The
strong positive eﬀect of ecm1 in the unemployment rate equation gives further
support to this interpretation. Real product wages are equilibrium correcting
to ecm5, and are negatively aﬀected by ecm3, the Balassa-Samuelson relation.
The productivity is equilibrium correcting to the Balassa-Samuelson rela-
tion (ecm3) and is positively aﬀected by (ecm4). The latter suggests that
productivity has improved when consumer price inﬂation has been above its
steady-state value. This seems to be a consequence of the strong product
market competition in this period (cf. discussion at page 9).
The unemployment rate has increased when real product wages are above
their steady-state value (ecm1) and has been equilibrium correcting to the real
consumer wage relation (ecm2). Unemployment rate has decreased in periods
when productivity has been above its steady-state value (ecm3), and it has
been equilibrium correcting to ecm5.
The inflation rate has been equilibrium correcting to the internal and ex-
ternal price wedge (ecm4). It is notable that inﬂation rate has is not been
aﬀected by real wages in excess of productivity. This is still another indication
of the price pressure due to the increased competitiveness in the product mar-
ket. It gives further support to the interpretation that the cost-push inﬂation
of the seventies has been replaced by pricing-to-market with adjustment in
unemployment and productivity rather than adjustment in inﬂation.
The internal price wedge has been equilibrium correcting to the Balssa-
Samuelsson relation and, in addition, been negatively aﬀected by real product
wages being above their steady-state value.
The real exchange rate has been equilibrium correcting both to ecm4, de-
scribing the inﬂation rate adjustment mechanism, and to ecm5 describing de-
mand pressure in the labor market.
The government bond rate has declined as a result of productivity increasing
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more than the internal price wedge, probably describing the general decline
in European interest rates as a result of the nominal and real convergence
in Europe. The negative eﬀect on the bond rate from an improvement of
real consumption wages relative to its steady-state value (ecm2) is probably
also related to the general convergence. It is equilibrium correcting to ecm5,
suggesting a fairly strong and highly signiﬁcant eﬀect from unemployment in
excess of its steady-state value. The latter is likely to reﬂect the fact that
the ﬁnancing of high unemployment rates by issuing government bonds will
generally increase the bond rate.
6 Conclusions
Based on a cointegrated VAR analysis this paper has investigated the wage,
price, and unemployment dynamics in Spain during the period 1983:3 to
2003:3, a period which approximately coincides with the Spanish convergence
process towards the European level of inﬂation rates, interest rates, and pur-
chasing power parity. The following ﬁndings can be emphasized as being par-
ticularly important for the three overriding questions in the introduction:
1. Real wages claims in excess of productivity growth seem to have resulted
in increased unemployment rather than in price inﬂation.
2. Only very weak evidence of a Phillips-curve relationship could be found
in the data.
3. The real exchange rate (i.e. the competitiveness in the tradable sector)
seems to have played a dominant role for the Spanish wage determination
through its impact on the mark-up and has strongly inﬂuenced the level
of the aﬀordable product wage and the acceptable consumption wage.
4. Productivity and the internal price wedge has moved closely together over
the sample period, signifying the importance of the Balassa-Samuelson
eﬀect.
5. Unemployment rates have signiﬁcantly come down at the end of the
period as a result of real wage restraints, of a competitive level of real
exchange rates, and a low level of interest rate.
6. Consumer price inﬂation has adjusted to the internal and external price
wedge in an equilibrium correcting manner. At the end of the period this
adjustment process has brought the Spanish inﬂation rate in line with
the European level.
We think the results contain important lessons to be learnt for the new EU
member states. First of all, it seems crucial to maintain high competitiveness
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in the tradable sector in order to achieve a successful convergence towards the
European purchasing power parity level. The increase in consumption wages
and consumer prices as a result of the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect should not be
allowed to exceed the improvement in productivity. Second, before ﬁxing the
real exchange rate it seems crucial that it is on its sustainable (competitive)
purchasing power parity level. Third, there does not seem to be a short-cut to a
European level of standard of living: the path to sustainable prosperity seems
to follow the path of productivity improvement. Forth, excessive real wage
increases seem to lead to increasing unemployment, slowdown in productivity
growth, higher interest rates, and loss of competitiveness. On the other hand,
the access to the European market and the possibility of increased export
demand is likely to speed up the convergence process as long as competitiveness
is not eroded by excess wage increases.
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Table 1: The cointegration rank
Modulus of the 6 largest characteristic roots
r = 4 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.82 0.81 0.68
r = 5 1.00 1.00 0.87 0.83 0.80 0.68
r = 6 1.00 0.87 0.83 0.82 0.67 0.55
Adjustment coeficientes (t-ratios)
rw q u ∆p pp rer lr
αˆ4 0.31 -0.63 -1.46 5.26 5.30 -1.56 -2.02
αˆ5 -0.62 -6.46 1.81 -1.18 -0.91 -0.64 -1.72
αˆ6 1.87 0.77 -1.64 -0.29 -3.88 -3.47 -0.99
Trace test
p− r r Eig.Value Trace Trace* Cval95 Cval95*
7 0 0.78 390.71 329.74 150.35
6 1 0.64 271.86 232.11 117.45 157.98
5 2 0.54 190.28 161.10 88.55 123.59
4 3 0.45 128.48 107.70 63.66 92.37
3 4 0.37 80.91 68.33 42.77 65.18
2 5 0.29 44.94 37.10 25.73 44.95
1 6 0.20 17.41 15.43 12.45 21.34
Probability in brackets. Bold face indicates |t−ratio| > 2. Trace∗ stands for the Barlett corrections
to the standard Trace test for the I1-model. Cval95 is the critical values corresponding to a model without
dummies. Cval95∗ is the simulated critical values at 5% for the I1-model with shift dummies.
Table 2: The long-run structure
rw q u ∆p pp rer lr Ds861 Ds923 Ds991 trend
βˆ1 1.00
[NA]
−1.00
[NA]
- - 1.00
[NA]
−0.75
[−6.12]
- −0.14
[−6.79]
0.37
[10.75]
0.26
[11.00]
−0.012
[−17.69]
βˆ2 1.00
[NA]
−1.00
[NA]
1.23
[13.59]
- - −0.47
[−7.00]
- −0.04
[−4.60]
0.06
[4.71]
0.16
[11.22]
-
βˆ3 - 1.00
[NA]
- - −0.31
[−7.60]
- - - 0.08
[9.03]
- −0.004
[−17.46]
βˆ4 - - - 1.00
[NA]
0.04
[9.18]
0.02
[3.91]
- - - - -
βˆ5 −0.75
[−10.67]
- 1.00
[NA]
- - −0.42
[−10.38]
−3.96
[−12.16]
- 0.08
[7.19]
0.08
[10.84]
-
t-values in brackets. LR-test for the restricted model: χ2(10) = 6.48 with p-value 0.77.
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Table 3: The short-run structure
∆rwt ∆qt ∆ut ∆2pt ∆ppt ∆rert ∆lrt
∆rwt−1 0.35
[4.22]
- - - 0.09
[3.79]
−0.22
[−2.19]
0.03
[3.06]
∆qt−1 - −0.32
[−3.63]
- 0.13
[4.78]
- - 0.04
[3.53]
∆ut−1 - −1.10
[−4.80]
0.21
[3.69]
- - - -
∆2pt−1 - 0.31
[2.10]
- - −0.28
[−3.96]
- 0.06
[2.71]
∆ppt−1 −0.78
[−3.86]
- 0.13
[3.82]
−0.24
[−3.75]
0.22
[2.85]
1.20
[4.31]
−0.05
[−2.15]
∆rert−1 - - - - - - -
∆lrt−1 - - −0.51
[−3.20]
- −0.57
[−2.04]
- 0.55
[6.83]
ecm1t−1 0.25
[6.26]
0.05
[2.73]
0.06
[10.6]
- −0.04
[−6.68]
0.10
[3.53]
0.01
[2.31]
ecm2t−1 −1.11
[−9.26]
- −0.10
[−6.66]
- - - −0.06
[−4.57]
ecm3t−1 −0.86
[−6.48]
−0.51
[−5.17]
- - 0.19
[5.64]
- −0.08
[−4.25]
ecm4t−1 - - - −0.87
[−10.5]
- −1.09
[−2.73]
-
ecm5t−1 −2.93
[−9.01]
0.66
[2.93]
0.26
[4.53]
- - −0.76
[−2.07]
−0.26
[−7.13]
Constant 2.66
[4.39]
−3.16
[−5.67]
- 0.10
[10.5]
1.05
[6.21]
- -
DDS861t 0.06
[4.69]
- - 0.01
[3.42]
0.04
[8.61]
- -
DDS923t - - 0.01
[2.85]
- - 0.10
[5.64]
0.01
[2.51]
DDS991t - - −0.01
[−4.66]
- - - -
DP011t - 0.05
[4.26]
−0.02
[−8.81]
- 0.01
[3.15]
- -
DP951t - - - - - 0.10
[6.18]
-
where
ecm1 = rwt − qt + ppt − 0.75 rert − 0.15Ds861 + 0.37Ds923 + 0.31Ds991 − 0.012 t
ecm2 = rwt − qt + 1.16ut − 0.47 rert − 0.05Ds861 + 0.07Ds923 + 0.18Ds991
ecm3 = qt − 0.004 t− 0.31 ppt + 0.07Ds923
ecm4 = ∆pt + 0.03 ppt + 0.02 rert
ecm5 = ut − 0.75 rwt − 0.42 rert − 3.96 lrt + 0.08Ds923 + 0.08Ds991
t-valuesin brackets.
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Figure 1: Productivity, unemployment and the internal price wedge
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Figure 2: Real producer wages, real exchange rates and productivity
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(a) Real producer wages corrected for productivity and real exchange rates
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Figure 3: Real consumer wages, unemployment and inﬂation
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(a) Real consumer wages corrected for productivity and unemployment
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Figure 4: Unemployment, the long-term bond rate and inﬂation
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(a) Unemployment and the long-term bond rate
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Figure 5: Productivity, employment and real GDP
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Figure 6: Wage share of output prices and of consumer prices
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Figure 7: Recursively calculated test statistic for constant β
The test statistic is scaled by the 5% critical value
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The test statistic is scaled by the 5% critical value
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(b) Backward estimation
Figure 8: Stability of the loadings α (I)
Alpha estimated with Beta fixed at full-sample estimate
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(a) α1
Alpha estimated with Beta fixed at full-sample estimate
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Figure 9: Stability of the loadings α (II)
Alpha estimated with Beta fixed at full-sample estimate
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(a) α3
Alpha estimated with Beta fixed at full-sample estimate
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Figure 10: Stability of the loadings α (and III)
Alpha estimated with Beta fixed at full-sample estimate
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